precisely because he deals with a text far too briefly. Some interpretations of particular texts feel slightly far-fetched and repetitive. This, however, does not imply that the argument as such lacks rigor or is not convincing with its own premises. Yet the book's strength is doubtless its theoretical stance rather than applied criticism. The amount of background knowledge behind the readings is impressive, not least the vast erudition in history and philosophy. It is a highly stimulating book for a number of audiences, including speculative fiction scholars, YA scholars, philosophers, educators, and cognitive critics.
International children's literature research is eagerly embracing the "cognitive turn," and Crago's and Oziewicz's books contribute to this new "way of thinking about literature" (Stockwell 6, original emphasis). Whether this direction will sustain and develop or pass as a temporary fashion remains to be seen.
reading, and it results in yet another call for "open," dialogic, inventive, and democratic reading.
This call is by now familiar, but it is the contextualizing of this call that is of interest here. Rudd's presentation of Lacanian concepts and ideas is confident and thorough. We could not ask for a more lucid description of the Lacanian notions of language and the place of language in the psychic struggle to negotiate this tripartite world, this world of a Borromean-knotted Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real. For those inclined to read literature from the point of view of psychoanalytic theory, this book is a treat. Rudd not only manages to discuss children's literature from the perspective of Lacan's three categories, but he also discusses children's literature from the perspective of the three categories connected, forming an inextricable unit. He also provides a very useful glossary of Lacanian terms. His point is to demonstrate that children's literature, like all literature, is not, in itself, a genre, but rather a collection of discrete texts all grappling with the same problems, problems that have to do with the way in which language attempts to make sense of our existential situation, to clarify just what being in the world means.
The project here, like all such projects, employs a fundamental contradiction. It is one thing to say that the reading of literature ought to be open, that anyone's reading is potentially as sensible as anyone else's reading (Rudd invokes the redoubtable David Bleich), and that the reason rests on the slippery nature of language, its way of wiggling out of one sense and squirreling into another before escaping that one and continuing the scamper through a myriad of possibilities of meaning, and another thing to say that Lacan's particular language sets out for us the meaning of the work we are reading. I guess the moral is: the more there is of meaning, the less there is of openness. Or to put this another way, I can say any reading must rest on some assumptions about reading and these assumptions will inevitably curtail meaning. Openness is an impossible dream; our reading of literature is not a dream, but it may perhaps become one.
Having said this, I can only search for phrases to sing the praises of Rudd's achievement. I see that achievement as twofold: first, he explains, as I have indicated, Lacanian theory clearly, and along the way puts the Freudian notion of the uncanny squarely in his sights. Rudd has much to say about the uncanny, but he overlooks Anna Jackson's chapter in The Gothic in Children's Literature (2008) . Second, he offers rewarding readings of a number of literary texts. As far as I am concerned, his book comes into its own in these textual readings. Piece (1976) and Anthony Browne's Zoo (1994). His readings are always engaging, and sometimes they engage with others as he does in his discussion of Winnie-the-Pooh. Here he takes issue with Daphne Kutzer, pointing out the flaws in her argument. I note this particular case because it highlights both the acuity of Rudd's reading, and also the blinkered nature of his "heretical" reading. For all its faults, Kutzer's reading of Milne does raise issues relating to the situation of the child in relation to both the adults who write for her and the polity that calls to her. In other words, Kutzer deals with the colonial aspect of British children's books, a topic dealt with perhaps more intricately in work by the likes of Clare Bradford, Mavis Reimer, Perry Nodelman, and others. Rudd prefers not to pursue a reading of children's books that surfaces power relationships and examines the subtle working of interpellation. This may explain his limited use of the work of John Stephens and his giving short shrift to "ideology." And this is fine. His readings are cogent in terms of his Lacanian focus.
Take, for example, his exploration of The Missing Piece. Here he finds a text (with a footnote to Karen Coats, who offers a Lacanian reading of that text in her 2004 book) that nicely fits his desire, to locate in a children's book all that a Lacanian reading could ask for, including that pesky objet a. I will not rehearse the reading here, except to say that the missing piece is that crucial bit that we existential wanderers lack, that we quest for, and that we cannot find without ceasing to move and create and be. To find the missing piece is to complete the circle and end the search; the struggle ends and lifelessness ensues. The reading is incisive, and it relies not at all on an assumption that this book is specifically for children. For Rudd, the audience for this and any so-called children's book is uncannily beyond our reach. Books, readers, readings-they come in all shapes and sizes and capabilities and imaginings. What they all have in common is their humanity and this humanity is distinctive because it must employ language to cover that which is empty, those holes we keep believing contain something, something important that will complete us and make us full.
This kind of thinking allows Rudd to find both hope and despair in Lacan's Symbolic, Real, and Imaginary. The first of these allows us to function in communities, the second threatens to flip us into a chaos that is either terrifying or joyful, and the third gives us something to seek. The deep connection between these three "states of the human soul," to purloin a phrase, gives Rudd what he needs to argue for the necessary relationship between fantasy and reality. Rather than being two separate modes or genres, fantasy and realism are two sides of the same Möbius strip. The argument here is salutary.
And so I conclude that this is a book well worth your attention. It has its own bounce, just as it has its own limitations. What else is new? But the argument is informed and carefully set out. At the beginning, Rudd announces that his is a heretical approach, and I guess in relation to those he grapples with-Nodelman, Zipes, Kutzer, and so on-it is. But in the scheme of things, the argument that children and their books differ little from adults and their books in that they all deal with the loose connection between signifier and signified, and they all record the desire for completion while avoiding that completion assiduously is familiar. Everything depends upon the saying. And so finally I note the final text to come under scrutiny in Rudd's book is A.S. Byatt's The Children's Book (2010), a book he says "is precisely not for children" (176) . But it appears that it is about children and the books they might read. That Rudd chooses to end his study of children's books and the child reader with a book about children and child reading that is not for children simply reminds us that books reach readers not by some preprogrammed set of conventions, but rather by the difficulty of their language and the relevance of their subjects to any possible readers. 
